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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Direct menu costs, such as writing new price tags, may not play a substantial role
in e-commerce, as firms can change prices with a few mouse clicks, and technology
ensures the synchronization of prices on all platforms on which the firm operates.
Some components of price adjustment costs (PACs), such as the managerial costs of
deciding if, and by how much, to change prices, could be an important reason why
firms ask for different prices. PAC arises from the costs of gathering information
on competitors’ prices and consumers’ reactions to price changes, and the costs of
deciding on the extent and timing of price changes.1 For instance, Kauffman and
Lee (2010) conclude that PAC are one reason for price dispersion (PD), even in
the presence of the most advanced information technology. There is, however, little
evidence on the empirical impact of PACs on PD.
Economists frequently focus on price dispersion (PD) because it “reflects the
ignorance of the market” (Stigler, 1961). In efficient markets, PD should only be
a disequilibrium phenomenon that vanishes over time, and in perfect markets, we
expect a PD of zero. The question of whether online markets are more efficient
than conventional markets is central in the analysis of e-commerce. For example,
Gorodnichenko et al. (2018) show that even in e-commerce markets, PD does not
vanish over time and it is important to identify why in order to understand PD in
online markets. We show that PACs are, among others, one reason for diverse prices
in e-commerce.
We analyze the effect of firms’ PAC on PD using panel data from the dominant
price comparison site in Austria, geizhals.at (“miser” or “skinflint”), and cover the
universe of Austrian firms with an online shop. Firms post prices for goods in narrow
categories. The price comparison site lists the prices along with product descriptions,
availability, shipping costs, pay formalities, and so on, which substantially reduces
1We should note that some authors consider the managerial costs of price changes as components
of menu costs (e.g., Blinder et al. (1998) or Levy et al. (1997)). However, it is more common to
see PAC as the sum of direct menu costs and managerial costs. Costain and Nakov (2015) also
argue that a firm pays a cost for managerial decisions when setting prices.
1
the search costs for consumers.2 We analyze 241,606 products listed between July
1, 2006 and December 31, 2012.
We proxy PAC by the firms’ price setting behavior using three different sets of
proxies. First, following Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), we use the number and
size of price changes. We expect that firms that change their prices less often will
have a greater PAC than firms that change their prices more often. In addition,
firms that change their prices less often might in consequence change their prices by
more than firms that change their prices more often. Second, following Fisher and
Konieczny (2000), we consider the synchronicity of price changes for multi-product
firms. Firms that change the prices of their goods at the same time (or by the same
amount) might have a greater PAC than firms that change the prices of their goods
more discerningly. Third, we also use the rank of the prices to construct a proxy for
PAC. If the rank of a firm’s price in the distribution of all prices for this product
varies little over time; for example, if it is consistently the third lowest price, we
expect the firm to have low PAC as the firm succeeds in keeping the rank in the
price listing.
E-commerce is an appropriate field to study PD and PACs. In this area, both
should be negligibly small. The homogeneity of traded products and Bertrand com-
petition should drive PD to zero. Consumers’ low search costs should also support
this effect. Due to low search costs, small price differences between retailers should
strongly influence consumers’ buying decisions. Hence, we expect PD to be small
in e-commerce markets. Given the penetration of IT in this market, we also expect
PAC to be small. If we find a causal effect of PAC on PD, even in markets where
we do not expect a substantial connection between these two variable, it would be
a valuable insight into the functions of markets.
Two sources of endogeneity might threaten the causal interpretation that PAC
has a significant impact on PD in online markets. Firms might select themselves into
markets according to the current PD; second, firms might adopt technologies such
as price monitoring software according to the PD in the market. We address these
2Bodoh-Creed et al. (2017) argue that the increase in online trade might have increased search
costs, as searches for a product require sophisticated techniques or costly information processing.
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two potential sources of endogeneity using an instrumental variables approach in
which we use the firm’s listing decision for earlier versions of goods as an instrument
for its current price setting behavior.
We obtain robust results that suggest that there is indeed a causal link from
firms’ heterogeneous price setting costs to PD. We find evidence for this causal
link when controlling for other possible causes for PD, such as consumers’ search
costs, obfuscation, or vertical constraints. Our results show that prices are less
flexible than the theoretical expectation of Jevons (1871)’ “Law of one Price” pre-
dicts. Amongst other explanations, PAC acts as a substantial price rigidity, even
in such competitive markets as e-commerce, where we would not expect PAC—and
other reasons—to play an important role in the determination of PD.3 However, our
results demonstrate that over time, the influence of PAC on PD weakened. Techno-
logical advances in price setting, such as intelligent price setting algorithms, could
contribute to more efficient markets in the future.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we find that an increase
in PAC should lead to more PD. Second, we provide and test several proxies for
PAC in e-commerce (including evidence on synchronized price changes). Third, we
offer a comprehensive set of control variables that control for most of the alternative
theoretical explanations for PD. Fourth, we suggest an instrumental variable strat-
egy to solve potential endogeneity biases arising from firms’ potential selection into
markets with a certain PD. Sixth, we illustrate that greater PAC leads not always
to greater PD, and we exemplify that under certain conditions an increase in the
level or the heterogeneity of PAC could also reduce PD.
2 PAC and other explanations for PD
Several studies show a comparable or smaller PD in online markets than in conven-
tional markets (e.g., computer memory (Ellison and Ellison, 2009) or books (Clay
3From the viewpoint of economic policy, this might even have implications for aggregate price-
level indicators and their ability to relay information from the micro- to the macro-economic level,
where decisions about policy interventions are necessary. For instance, Midrigan (2011) discusses
the implications of monetary policy shocks in a menu-costs model when prices are dispersed.
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et al., 2001), see also Clemons et al. (2002)). Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) find a
lower PD for online channels when prices are weighted with market shares compared
to conventional retail channels. Zhuang et al. (2018) document higher online PD
than oﬄine PD and state that heterogeneous retailers who compete for consumers
with different perception of transaction risk explains this difference.
From a dynamic perspective, Pan et al. (2003) show a declining PD for 2000 and
2001 and an increase from 2001 to 2003. Baye et al. (2004b) analyze data from a price
comparison site and find only limited evidence of shrinking PDs. Kaplan and Menzio
(2015) analyze the structure of PD based on Nielsen’s Scantrack Markets (mainly
products bought in traditional brick and mortar stores) and find constant PD over
time. Gorodnichenko et al. (2018) find similar, or even larger, PD in online shopping
platforms than in brick-and-mortar stores. They estimate PD on the frequency and
absolute size of regular price changes, as well as on the synchronization of posted
price changes, which are common proxies for PAC. They estimate that the more
frequent and the larger the price changes are, the more prices vary, but they find no
effect of synchronized price changes on PD. Although Gorodnichenko et al. (2018)
provide helpful insights into the firms’ price setting behavior in e-commerce, they do
not control for potential endogeneity issues or alternative explanatory approaches
to explain PD.
Several theories might explain the existence of PD.
Price adjustment cost
Levy et al. (1997) report that menu costs are as large as 0.7% of revenue and Zbaracki
et al. (2004) provide an estimate of about 1.2% of revenue. Zbaracki et al. (2004)
show that PACs consists not only of the physical costs of price changes, but also
include managerial costs to gather information, make decisions, and communicate.
They stress that the managerial costs are six times greater than the direct costs of
price changes are.
Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2007) find strong evidence that in e-commerce, the
managerial costs component is an important reason for nominal price rigidities.
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Bergen et al. (2003) argue that spill-over effects from high menu costs in the brick and
mortar stores might also be relevant for the magnitude of the PAC in multichannel
online shops. As different prices for different distribution channels might deter
customers, high menu costs in the brick and mortar store could delay price changes
in the online store.4
Businesses that have both online and oﬄine stores are becoming more com-
mon. The increase in multichannel businesses could contribute to more online PD if
price setting in oﬄine distribution channels influences the price setting in the online
channel (Bergen et al., 2003). Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) find that even after
controlling for shipping, handling costs, and taxes, online prices are lower than in
conventional markets. They also find that online firms change prices by smaller
amounts than do conventional firms. Bailey (1998) find that online firms increase
prices more frequently than conventional firms do. These findings suggest lower
PACs for online markets.
Kauffman and Lee (2010) present a survey on PACs and conclude that PAC are
one reason for price rigidity, even in the presence of the most advanced information
technology. However, their study provides hardly any empirical evidence on the
impact of PACs on PD. Using a field experiment, Anderson et al. (2015) analyze
the probability of prices changes depending on the size of the PACs, and find that
the lower the PACs are, the higher is the probability of price changes.
There are surprisingly few theoretical models of the effect of PACs on PD.
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) present a model to explain the effect of inflation on
firms’ price setting. In this model, an increase in the costs of price adjustment leads
to less frequent and larger price changes. Fishman (1992) provides a model in which
search costs and PACs affect PD, and increased PD is one of the real effects of
inflation. Benabou (1988, p. 364) gives an explicit result on the impact of PACs
on PD, “As it becomes less costly to change prices, firms do it more frequently,
thereby reducing (for any given maximum real price) the amount of PD and raising
4Dulleck et al. (2011) show that online stores that have a pick up facility generate more demand
than do internet-only stores.
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the average price in the market.” Obviously, the underlying literature assumes a
positive relationship between PAC and PD unambiguously.
Although we do not wish to question this common wisdom fundamentally, we
want to make clear that this assumption does not hold in any case. We illustrate in
the appendix that under certain, but not unusual conditions, an increase in PACs
might also result in less PD. However, as these situations are (statistically) rarer,
we expect PAC to have a positive impact on PD.
Search cost:
Search models stress the heterogeneity in customers’ search costs. For example,
Carlson and McAfee (1983) suggest consumers’ search costs as a driving factor in
PD. Kaplan et al. (2016) suggest that PD results from price discrimination between
high-valuation customers, who prefer to make all of their purchases in the same
store, and low-valuation buyers, who are willing to purchase different products from
different e-shops. In Menzio and Trachter (2018), PD results from buyers who differ
in their ability to shop at only one or different stores. Caglayan et al. (2008) ana-
lyze the PD in bazaars and supermarkets and find a lower PD in bazaars compared
to supermarkets and attribute this to the easier comparability of prices in bazaars
compared to supermarkets. Baylis and Perloff (2002) find evidence for the Salop-
Stiglitz model search model, in which firms price discriminate across informed and
uninformed consumers and thereby generate PD. Pan et al. (2001) argue that con-
sumers search more when a product is more expensive (they speak also of consumer
involvement); hence, PD for more expensive products should be greater than that
for cheaper products. The authors also argue that products with greater demand
should have less PD than products with less demand, as information, such as more
consumer ratings, is more readily available.
In our estimations we control for both the products’ absolute price as well as the
demand for the product in order to control for search cost.
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Various firm heterogeneities
Firms could follow different strategies in how they handle inventories. Some firms
maintain stock to attract impatient customers and other firms might only order the
product from the wholesaler upon receiving an order. Firms that keep stock might
accept low, or even negative, markups to reduce their stock, such as towards the
end of a product’s life cycle. In that sense, Aguirregabiria (1999) discusses how
inventory influences firms’ markup behavior. Different markups might result in PD.
Our data provide the status of a product’s availability which we use as proxy for
inventories in our estimations.
Betancourt and Gautschi (1993), Ratchford and Stoops (1988), and Pan et al.
(2004) stress service differentiation as an explanation for PD. Pan et al. (2002) and
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) explain the PD they observe in online markets by
differences in firms’ service quality. As potential buyers see different service qualities
of a homogeneous product, firms could set their prices accordingly. We control for
the varying service levels of online shops using changes in consumer ratings.
Brand loyalty could also be responsible for PD (Wernerfelt (1991)). In e-commerce
this argument is closely connected to trust (Ribbink et al., 2004) and brand aware-
ness (Chen and Hitt, 2001). Degeratu et al. (2000) argue that the less information
consumers have about product attributes, the more important brand names become
in online markets compared to oﬄine markets. We use firm fixed effects to control
for brand names and other unobserved firm heterogeneities in our panel estimations.
Obfuscation strategies (“bait and switch” strategies), different consumer percep-
tions of shipping costs or different local taxes could also cause PD (e.g., Pan et al.
(2002) or Ellison and Ellison (2009)). We control for obfuscation strategies using
the firms’ shipping costs, which are listed separately from the prices.
Kauffman and Wood (2007) suggest that PD could result if some, but not all,
firms agree on price collusion. Furthermore, time lags in price adjustment in a
Bertrand Edgeworth competition could explain PD. Clemons et al. (2002) suggest
price discrimination as a potential reason for PD. Other reasons why firms do not
continuously change their prices are information-processing lags, customer accep-
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tance, strategic recognition, or managerial inattention (Davis and Hamilton (2004),
Ellison and Snyder (2011)).
Market heterogeneity
Carlton (1986) argues that firms in less concentrated markets tend to change their
prices less frequently than do firms in highly competitive ones. Similarly, Haynes
and Thompson (2008) and Nelson et al. (2007) stress market structure and find a
strong positive relationship between the number of sellers and PD. Moreover, they
argue that seller heterogeneity might be an important determinant of PD. However,
a lack of data on e-seller attributes, especially cost differences, prevents them from
further exploring this issue. Our data contain a broad variety of control variables,
which allows us to pick up at the point of the limitations of their data. Barron
et al. (2004) empirically estimate the relationship between seller density, average
product price, and PD in the retail gasoline industry. We can control potential
market structures with the change in the number of offering firms and the number
of changes in price leadership.
Vertical restraints might be an additional cause for (the lack of) PD, which the
existing literature did not discuss thus far. If manufacturers have a strong influence
on the firms’ prices, we expect prices to be more similar than when manufacturers do
not have such influence. In our panel estimations, we use the change in the spread
of the firms’ concentration on branded products on the market as a proxy for these
vertical restraints.
3 Data and Estimation Strategy
We use data on 241,606 products listed on the Austrian price comparison site
www.geizhals.at between July 1, 2006 and December 31, 2012. The site is the
main price comparison site in Austria and covers the universe of offering firms.
The data are ideal to study the relationship between firms’ PAC and the PD of a
product for several reasons. First, the website is the main price listing site and has
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close to all firms in the (Austrian) e-commerce market.5 Compared to price search
engines in other countries, prices listed in geizhals.at are not only a representative
sample of offering firms, it is the whole population of e-commerce in Austria within
the offered product categories. Second, the data provide very detailed characteristics
of firms and products, including product availability, shipping costs, pay formalities,
and customer ratings. Third, our dataset includes data from 1,113 firms. These firms
can change their prices at any time directly in the geizhals.at system. Firms pay
for each referral request from the price search engine to its web-shop (pay-per-click
model). A legal contract between geizhals.at and the online-shop guarantees that
the price listed in the price search engine has to be equal to the price shown in the
online shop. Fourth, the dataset includes product and firm characteristics together
with consumers’ behavior over a long period. Thus, the dataset also offers reliable
and robust instruments to identify causal inference.
We analyze PD in a panel dataset for product i at time t.6 The products are
mainly consumer articles listed on the price search engine, which we can classify
into a hierarchical system of categories, subcategories, and subsubcategories.7 Time
t refers to quarters over a period of more than 6 years. The panel is unbalanced,
with 31,730 products in 2006 and 88,948 products by the end of 2012.
Measures of PD
Prior studies used several measures of PD: the coefficient of variation (e.g., Baye et
al. (2004a) or Sorenson (2000)), the value of information (e.g., Baye et al. (2003)
or Pan et al. (2004), and the difference between the best and the second lowest
price (e.g., Baye et al. (2004a). The coefficient of variation (CoV ) is the ratio of
5The actual sales for most of the shops are not available. However, the authors have anecdotal
evidence from personal correspondence with the web-shop managers: “The first day we can get rid
of geizhals.at will be the best day of my life” is one quote that alludes to the fact that geizhals.at
does indeed bring orders, but at the same time, reduces the profit opportunities due to competition.
6We restricted our dataset to product markets with at least two suppliers. Moreover, to elimi-
nate possible outliers due to input errors from e-tailers, we eliminate observations with (i) prices
higher than e10,000 (these products are typically not traded via e-commerce), (ii) a difference
between the mean price and the minimum price (value of information, VoI) of more than 500%,
and (iii) a difference between the lowest and the second lowest price quote above 200%.
7Geizhals.at originally specialized in the “hardware,” “software,” “games,” “video/foto/tv,”
“telephone,” and “audio and hifi-systems” product categories. In the last years, they introduced
the “household appliances,” “sports and recreation equipment,” and “drugstore items” product
categories.
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the standard deviation of the prices for a product i offered by firm j to its average
price, p¯i,t, CoVi,t =
√
Var(pi,j,t)/Mean(pi,t). The VoI (V oI) measures the difference
between the mean and the minimum price as a fraction of the minimum price,
V oIi,t = [Mean(pi,j,t) − Min(pi,j,t)]/Min(pi,j,t). The V oI indicates the customer’s
savings by buying at the minimum price instead at the mean price. Finally, we also
use the difference between the best price and the second lowest price divided by the
best price, D 1 2i,t, as the third PD indicator.
In contrast to the CoV or the V oI, which incorporate more information on the
distribution of prices, D 1 2i,t focuses only on the two lowest prices, which, arguably,
is the relevant part of the price distribution for consumers. We thus expect a weaker
association between PAC andD 1 2i,t than for the other two indicators. We measure
all three of our indicators at the last day of a quarter t at noon. A quick descriptive
glance over our measures for PD reveals an average increase of about 40% over our
estimation period.8
Measures of PAC
Direct measures of PAC are not available. Instead, we use different interpretations
of the firms’ price setting behavior over a quarter to calculate several proxy variables
for their PAC.
• We suspect that the duration between price changes and the size of the price
changes indicate differences in firms’ PACs (e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008)). Firms that change their prices often perhaps have lower PACs in
contrast to firms that change their prices infrequently.
The indicator LENGHT∆pj,t is the average duration between the price changes
of all offered products i for firm j in quarter t. Similarly, HEIGHT∆pj,t is the
average of all price changes for all products offered by firm j in a quarter.9
As both indicators are likely to interact with each other, we also calculate the
8Specifically, the changes in PD are: (1) the CoV increased by 31.17%, (2) the V oI increased
by 43%, and D 1 2 grew by 53%.
9Note that for LENGHT∆pj,t and HEIGHT∆pj,t, we calculated the daily averages of the firms’
price changes and durations for all products. In a second step, we computed the average over all
days for a given firm.
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interaction term, L× H∆pj,t, as the average product of the duration between
two price changes with the size of the price change.
• Firms might not focus on the prices themselves, but are perhaps more con-
cerned with the position their prices have on the price listing site. If we assume
that a firm aims to maintain a certain rank in the price listings, we can use
the variance of the firms’ ranking as another proxy for PAC. Under this as-
sumption, a lower variance of the rank implies that the firm spends more effort
on setting the prices to maintain a certain position. This implies that these
firms have a lower PAC compared to firms whose prices change ranks more.
Because the number of firms influences the variation of ranking, we normalize
the ranks with the number of firms that offer the product. We calculate the
proxy as RANKj,t =
∑
i
√
Var(ri,j,t)/Ij, where r is the normalized rank and
Ij is the number of listed products of firm j.
• Our third set of proxies is based on firms’ synchronicity of price changes.10 A
large number of synchronous price changes, either with respect to the timing
or to the amount, could indicate a high PAC. We define the indicator STj,t,d for
the number of synchronous price changes normalized to the number of offered
goods at day d as:
STj,t,d =

0 if
∑Ij,t,d
i=1 δi,j,t,d ≤ 1,(∑Ij,t,d
i=1 δi,j,t,d
)
/Ij,t,d in all other cases,
(1)
where δi,j,t,d is a binary indicator of whether the price for product i changed
on day d or not. Ij,t,d denotes the total number of products firm j offered on
day d.
The average synchronicity of price changes is
SYNCTj,t =
∑
d STj,t,d
Dj
, (2)
10For the monopoly case, Sheshinski and Weiss (1992) show that a store tends to change the
prices of different products in sync rather than adopting a staggered price policy. Furthermore,
Fisher and Konieczny (2000) suggest different indices for price synchronization.
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where Dj is the number of days on which firm j changed at least one price.
A firm with a lower PAC will change their prices more asynchronously than
a firm with a high PAC. We therefore expect SYNCTj,t to be a good proxy for
the firms’ PAC.
By construction, SYNCTj,t measures the degree of simultaneous price changes
and ignores the amount by which the prices change. We argue that a firm has
a lower PAC if it changes the price for each product individually than does a
firm that changes all prices by a certain amount or proportion. To account
for similar amounts of price changes, we use the coefficient of variation of the
price changes as the percent of the original price, ∆pi,j,t,d, on day d:
SHj,t,d =

undefined if
∑Ij,t,d
i=1 δi,j,t,d ≤ 1,
√
Var(∆pi,j,t,d)
Mean(∆pi,j,t,d)
in all other cases.
(3)
We calculate the average synchronicity of price changes in period t as the
average of the daily SHj,t,d:
SHj,t =
∑
d SHj,t,d
Dj
. (4)
This variable will be greater for firms with more variation in their price
changes. For ease of interpretation, we prefer the proxy to have greater values
when firms have similar price changes. We therefore transform the variable
such that lower values indicate more varied price changes, which we interpret
as a lower PAC, and that greater values indicate more similar price changes;
that is, a greater PAC:
SYNCHj,t = |SHj,t −max (SHj,t)|+min (SHj,t) . (5)
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The timing of price changes, SYNCTj,t, and the similarity of the amount of
price changes, SYNCHj,t, might interact with each other. To account for this
empirically, we calculate the interaction of the two indicators:
SYNCIj,t = SYNC
T
j,t × SYNCHj,t. (6)
We calculate the averages of each indicator at the product level i using the PAC
values of all firms j that offered product i in quarter t. The proxies for the firms’
PAC aggregated at the product level indicate whether the firms that offer a product
have, on average, a lower or higher PAC than do firms that offer some other product.
Let Li,j,t indicate firm j’s decision to offer product i (=dummy variable for the
listing decision) and Ji,t the total number of firms that offer product i. The average
PAC proxy for product i in quarter t is then
PACi,t =
∑
j PACj,tLi,j,t
Ji,t
. (7)
Table 1 provides the descriptions of our PAC and PD measures. As these in-
dicators are dimensionless, we use z-transformed variables with a zero mean and a
variance of one.
3.1 Hypotheses and Identification Strategy
We estimate the impact of PACs on PD with the following equation.
PDit = α + βPACit + γXit + νi + it, (8)
where PDit indicates the PD for product i at time t. The variable PACit is one of
our proxies for the PAC. The vector Xit contains product-specific and firm-specific
characteristics, for which we control for alternative explanations of PD. The variable
it is an error term and νi are product-specific fixed effects.
Although we do not rule out that under certain conditions an increase in PAC
can also result in less PD, in general, we expect that prices in markets in which the
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firm’s PAC are greater will be more dispersed; that is, β > 0. This is because a
higher PAC leads to a lower PD less often than it leads to a higher PD.11 (See the
appendix for more details on this hypothesis.)
The proxy for PAC in equation (8) is a composite of the firms’ listing decisions
Li,j,t and the costs of changing prices. Both components could be endogenous, as
firms might select into markets with a certain PD and possibly change their price
setting technology, and thus their PACs, depending on the market’s PD.
To account for the endogeneity of the listing decision, we use an instrumental
variable approach, where we instrument a firm’s listing decision by its listing decision
for an earlier variant of the product, Lˆi,j,t. We use the product’s predecessor for five
product generations. For example, we instrument the listing decision Li,j,t on the
xth day of product i’s life cycle by the firm’s listing decision on the xth day of the
life cycle for the product offered five product generations earlier.We define products
by their sub-subcategory in the hierarchical classification system of the price listing
site.12 We use the dates of the products’ first appearance on the price listing site
to date product generations. Because the PD of product i on day d was unknown
five product generations ago, we argue that the exclusion restriction should not be
violated.13
In the second case of the potential endogenous adaption of price setting tech-
nology, we argue that it is extremely unlikely that a market’s PD determines the
firm’s PAC. A firm’s choice of price setting technology typically depends on aspects
besides the market’s PD, such as the operating costs, number of products, compat-
ibility with other software, costs to acquire information about competitors, and so
on.
If the choice of technology decision depends on the ease of changing the prices of
many products, it is even more unlikely that a market’s PD will determine the choice
11In contrast to the consequences of the level of PACs, Section 5.2 and the Appendix discuss the
impact of PAC heterogeneity, which is theoretically and empirically less clear-cut.
12The price listing site has a hierarchical classification of main categories (e.g., hardware), sub-
categories (e.g., input devices), and sub-subcategories (e.g., keyboards).
13Our argument for this instrument is similar to the argument in the shift-share approach com-
mon in the migration literature. See, for example, Card (2001).
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of technology. Note that in this sample, a firm offers 2,564 products on average and
there is considerable heterogeneity in PD for the average firm’s product assortment.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Main results
We present our main results in Table 2. Each number is a coefficient from a separate
two-stage least squares (2SLS) panel-data regression of one of our PAC proxies on
one of three PD indicators. For ease of comparison, we present the beta coefficients.
We transformed all measures of PD, PAC, and all controls to variables of mean 0 and
variance 1. In column (1), we tabulate the results using CoV as the PD indicator.
Column (2) tabulates the results using V oI, and column (3) tabulates the results
using the difference between the lowest and the second lowest price, D 1 2. We
report the F-statistics from the first stages in column (4). These range from 791 to
73,891. Each row has the same first stage specification.
Due to the instrumentation strategy, we lose 886,733 observations (34%) or
76,558 products (24%) for which we cannot define the instrument. The main reasons
for the sample losses are new firms entering the market, products listed at the begin-
ning of our records that lack a defined predecessor good, and long running products
that have a predecessor with a substantially shorter product life cycle. The selected
and full sample do not differ significantly.
Comparing the fixed effects panel regressions with the IV panel regressions shows
a clear tendency that the 2SLS coefficients are greater than those from regular OLS
panel regressions. This implies that firms with high (low) PAC tend to list on
product markets with low (high) PD. With our instrumentation strategy, we control
for this endogeneity problem.
Almost all coefficients are statistically significant at conventional error levels,
and 19 of the 21 coefficients are positive. The PAC based on the amount of price
changes, HEIGHT∆pj,t, cannot explain any variation in PD if we measure it using
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V oI or D 1 2. However, its coefficient is statistically different from zero if we use
the CoV to measure PD.
The results for the PD measure that focuses on only the two lowest prices, D 1 2,
are overall weaker than those for either CoV or V oI. This is not surprising, as the
D 1 2 indicator disregards any other information on the distribution of prices besides
the difference between the two lowest prices (this number is small if the two lowest
prices are close, even when the other prices have a large variance). The estimated
coefficients are negative in only two instances; in both cases, we measure PD by the
difference in the two lowest prices.
Hence, in the following interpretations, we focus primarily on the results from
the VoI and CoV measures of PD. Overall, we interpret these results as evidence of
the substantial role of PAC in PD, even in markets where we would not expect that
PAC is important.
If we compare the sizes of the estimated effects, we see that the effect of PAC
on PD is greatest when we use the duration between price changes as the proxy for
PAC. A look at our synchronization-based PAC measures reveals somewhat smaller
but similar explanatory power than the length between the price changes, especially
in the interaction between the timing and height of the price changes. The effect is
smallest when we use firms’ variances in price ranking in the listings as a proxy for
PAC. If we see our results as a test to identify the best proxy variables for PAC, we
recommend the average duration between two price changes LENGHT∆pj,t, which
is easy to calculate, or the more complex synchronicity measure SYNCIj,t. Measures
based on the price rankings are perhaps a worse approximation of the true underlying
PAC.
4.2 Alternative theories to explain PD
All of our regressions include a set of explanatory variables to control for other
potential sources of PD. The control variables are product-level characteristics, and
we aggregate firm characteristics for all firms that offer the product. We tabulate
the estimated beta coefficients for these variables in Table 3. These estimates use
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CoV as the measure of PD. The coefficients vary little if we use one of the other
two PD measures.
Section 2 also provides the background of and relevant literature on these alter-
native explanations.
Search costs
Search Costs: Search models argue that consumers invest more effort in searching
if the expected gain from this search is sufficiently large. Hence, we expect a lower
PD for expensive goods, as the relative gains are potentially larger than for cheaper
products. Since we use product-specific fixed effects in the panel estimation, we
cannot estimate this association directly. The coefficient on the deviation from the
average price, however, is not statistically significant. However, the estimations
based on pooled cross sections results in significantly lower PD for more expensive
products.
Inventories
Customers might make a tradeoff between product availability and price. A market
in which firms differentiate using a combination of these two dimension is thus likely
to have a greater PD. At the same time, availability is a good predictor of firms’
inventories.14 Especially at the end of a product life cycle, firms might accept even
negative markups to sell their stock.
Note that if all firms do (or do not) have the product available, then inventories
cannot explain PD. Hence, we are interested in the heterogeneous product availabil-
ity across offering firms. Therefore, we use the variance of firms’ availability, where
1 indicates that the product is readily available and 0 otherwise, as an indicator of
the heterogeneity in inventories.15
14Firms could have different business models: some firms could buy larger quantities and store
the products, which provides the advantage of lower wholesale prices at the expense of higher
storage costs. They also bear a greater entrepreneurial risk if demand for this product is low. In
the alternative business model, the retailer orders the products from the supplier when a customer
places an order. This second option reduces storage costs and lowers the entrepreneurial risk, but
at the cost of higher wholesale prices.
15We calculated our control as the variance of a Bernoulli distributed random variable p(1− p)
(with p indicating the probability of product availability).
17
The estimated coefficient indicates a significant positive effect of an increase in
the heterogeneity in availability, suggesting that a more disperse composition of
firms with regard to inventories will increase PD.
Service differentiation
PD could arise when firms use different strategies or differ in their ability to generate
brand loyalty. We include the average customer valuation of firms as a control
variable. This variable ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates the least satisfaction.16
The estimated coefficients for this indicator are negative and indicate that markets
served by firms with fewer satisfied customers have less PD.
More generally, the dispersion of firms’ customer evaluations is an indicator
of service differentiation among the firms. Hence, we also include the standard
deviation of the firms’ evaluation. The estimates indicate that the more varied the
customers’ views of the firms’ service in the market is, the greater the PD will be.
Prices in the firms’ brick and mortar channel might also be relevant for the PD
in online shops. For example, high PACs in the oﬄine business might reduce price
flexibility in the online outlet if different prices in different channels might deter
customers. If such spill-overs exist, we would expect that markets that have more
firms offering customers the option to pick up a product purchased online from one
of their stores have a greater PD. The results confirm this hypothesis, as markets
with more heterogeneity in the firms’ Pick-Up-Possibilities increase the market’s
PD.17 Comparing the beta coefficient with the other explanations for PD suggests
that the differing pick up options is among the most important factors in explaining
PD.
Obfuscation
Firms might deliberately obfuscate parts of the price to tempt impatient customers
into purchasing the product. We include the standard deviation of the firms’ ship-
16The ratings on the price comparison site is the average of all ratings over the last 12 months.
17As the share would be non-informative, we calculated our control as the variance of a Bernoulli
distributed random variable p(1− p) with p indicating the probability that the shop has a pick-up
option.
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ping costs as an indicator for how pronounced obfuscation is in a market. If ob-
fuscation strategies work, we expect a greater variance of shipping costs to increase
net PD. We do observe this phenomenon in our data, the estimated coefficient of
the standard deviation of shipping costs is positive and suggests that PD is indeed
greater when firms use obfuscation strategies.
Vertical restraints
Manufacturers with a strong influence on the retailers’ price setting (upstream mar-
ket power) may focus on maintaining a single high price for the product for all of its
retailers.18 When manufacturers exploit their upstream market power to maintain
uniform prices in downstream markets, these vertical restraints could lead to lower
PD in retailing. In markets which are characterized by strong vertical restraints, we
therefore expect a lower PD than in markets without vertical constraints.
To account for differences in such restraints across product markets, we distin-
guish between branded and unbranded products. We argue that vertical constraints
are more likely to exist for branded products than for unbranded products. We con-
struct an indicator for market heterogeneity and calculate the average of the firms’
share of branded products of all of their offered products as a proxy for the ties that
a retailer might have with an upstream manufacturer. The positive and significant
sign of Percentage Big Brand Std. supports our expectation.
Our estimation approach, which uses product fixed-effects, does not allow us to
create a direct control for branded products. The estimation results using the pooled
cross-section data without product fixed effects, in which we include a dummy for
branded products, indicate that branded products have significantly lower PD than
unbranded products do.
Market structure
PD might be a consequence of market structure which we control for using the
following indicators:
18Manufacturers typically want to maintain high prices since it provides greater profits for both
the retailer and the manufacturer, and do so through tactics such as more promotion.
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Average size of the firms : To approximate the average firm size, we use the total
number of clicks a firm obtains for all of its products listed on the price search
engine in the respective quarter.19 The greater this number is, the more products
the firm offers, and thus the larger the firm is. Our control variable Clicks on Firm
Avg. is the average of the total number of clicks of all offering firms of a market. In
our context, we interpret it as a proxy for firm size. As markets with larger firms
tend to be more concentrated, we would expect a lower PD in these markets.20 The
negative coefficient in our estimations confirms this expectation.21
Heterogeneity in firm sizes : The variable Clicks on Firm Std. calculates the
standard deviation of the total number of clicks of all offering firms and in our
context, can be a proxy for heterogeneity in firm sizes. We expect greater PD as the
heterogeneity in the firms in the market increases (in terms of size as total number of
clicks) (e.g., cost differences due to different economies of scale). The positive sign on
the estimation results confirms our expectation that offers from more heterogeneous
firms result in higher PD. Note that our indicators for the average firm size and the
heterogeneity in firm size are the most important factors explaining PD.
Strength of Demand: We measure the strength in demand by the number of
clicks from an Austrian IP address on the product (Austrian Clicks on Product).
The greater the demand for a product is, the more interesting the product will
be for retailers. Hence, an increase in the demand for a product should stimulate
additional market entries and therefore fiercer competition, resulting in a lower PD.
Our results support this hypothesis.
Number of competitors: As we discussed in Section 2, it is not clear if and how
the number of competitors affects PD. In our data, markets with a higher No. of
Offering Firms have a greater PD than do markets in which fewer firms are offering
19Clicks are the referrals from the price listing site to the firm’s homepage. They are the basis
for the fee that the firm pays for the listing.
20In our data, the correlation between Clicks on Firm Avg. and the number of offering firms is
-0.4016.
21This suggests that retailers in markets with few firms tend to be more homogeneous. This
might indicate more competitive pressure, that brings prices closer to marginal costs, and thus
reduces PD. The lack of theoretical and empirical evidence in this context opens an avenue for
further research.
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the product. This corresponds with the empirical literature on PD in online markets
(e.g., Haynes and Thompson (2008) or Nelson et al. (2007)).22
Strength of Competition: We obtain an alternative indicator for the market struc-
ture by examining which firm has the lowest price. We count how often the firm
that offers the lowest price changes, and interpret a greater number of price leader
changes as an indicator of a competitive market that pushes the prices closer to
marginal cost. Our results indicate that markets in which the price leader changes
more often have a lower PD than markets with fewer price leader changes do.
Seasonality
We also control for seasonal effects using binary indicators for the quarter. These
results show that the lowest PD occurs in the first quarter of a year, most likely due
to the seasonal pattern of clearance sales throughout the year.
5 Robustness
We provide several robustness checks to assess the robustness of our results. First,
we show the stability of our results when we stratify the sample by product char-
acteristics. Here, we use different levels of demand for the product, branded versus
unbranded products, and product type (e.g., hardware vs. software). Second, we
provide the results when we use the standard deviation of the firms’ PAC instead
of the average PAC as an alternative measure of PAC heterogeneity in a market.
Third, we estimate our specifications for different periods and split the data into an
earlier period (2006–2009) and a later period (2009–2012).
5.1 Varying product characteristics
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimation results when we stratify the sample according
to certain product characteristics.
22We confirm these results also using a pooled cross-sectional analysis. Although some of the
results for the effect of market structure on PD are relatively small, more competition and more
homogeneous firms lower PD.
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High versus low demand : Price setting could be more important for products
with greater demand. We expect a stronger association between PAC and PD in
markets with greater demand compared to those with relatively low demand. We
proxy the products’ overall demand by the total sum of clicks over our complete
observation period.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 present the estimation results where we distin-
guish between products with clicks below and above the median number of total
clicks. As expected, these estimates confirm our results in markets for high demand
products, as the results consistently suggest a greater PD when PACs are greater. In
contrast, in markets with low demand, several PAC indicators are not statistically
significant (however, the statistically significant proxies at conventional error levels
all point to the same positive association between PAC and PD).
The results also suggest that price setting for products with high demand is more
important to firms than that for products with low demand. This is not surprising
given that price setting for low demand products loses importance. It might well
be that some of the offers are historical relicts that the firms no longer actively
maintain (note that the listing itself produces no costs for the firm).
Branded versus unbranded products : Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 present
the estimates of the impact of PAC on PD for branded and unbranded products.
We interpret products with a brand as indicative of vertical constraints between an
upstream manufacturer and downstream retailers. Markets with stronger vertical
constraints are likely to have less PD, as the upstream firm has an interest in main-
taining a single price for its product across retailers. A descriptive comparison of
the PD indicators confirms this expectation.23
Even in markets in which vertical constraints exist with a higher probability,
we can confirm our results for the PAC measures: all but one PAC coefficient are
positive and statistically significant. Only for the sub-sample of non-branded prod-
ucts do we obtain a negative association between the rank measure RANK and PD.
Again, the RANK measure is perhaps not a good proxy for the true PAC.
23The respective PD measures for branded (non-branded) products are CoV=0.110 (0.129),
V oI=0.178 (0.220), and D 1 2=0.0688 (0.153).
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Different product types : Table 5 presents the estimation results when we split the
sample into sub-samples along the main product categories that the price comparison
site uses. Overall, our main results are robust to this stratification. Most of the
coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, some
categories contain only few products, such as Health and Beauty. The site operators
added these product categories to the price listing over time. Especially in these
smaller product categories, the estimated coefficients lack precision. We obtain
several negative coefficients for the perhaps less reliable proxies, such as HEIGHT∆p
and RANK.
5.2 PAC Heterogeneity
In our estimations above, we characterized each market by the average of firms’
PACs. To our knowledge, there is no theoretical model that links the variance in
price setting costs to the PD in the market. In the appendix, we illustrate the
implications of an increase in the heterogeneity in PACs on PD. Figure 2 (Panels
C and D) plots the resulting PD for various levels of heterogeneity in PACs. This
simple illustration suggests that an increase in the heterogeneity in PACs may not
only increase PD, but may also decrease PD in certain situations. The falling seg-
ments of the functions plotted in Panels C and D of Figure 2 illustrate this finding.
An increase in PAC heterogeneity means that some firms react slower, while others
are faster in their price-setting. In some situations, this behavior might result in
more similar prices (lower PD); while in others, the price gap between firms might
widen. Hence, whether more PAC heterogeneity increases or decreases PD remains
an empirical question.
To analyze this relationship empirically, we modify the aggregation from the firm
level to the market level, as in Equation (7), by using the standard deviation of the
firms’ PAC:
STD(PAC)i,t =
√∑
j(PACj,tLi,j,t −Mean(PACj,tLi,j,t))2
Ji,t
. (9)
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Table 6 replicates Table 2 using this alternative measure of the differences in
firms’ PACs. In particular, we find similar results compared to an increase in the
level of PACs and a tendency for more heterogeneity in PACs to result in more PD.
Overall, the results are less clear than above. For CoV and VoI, some of our PAC
measures are not statistically significant, and for two PAC measures, we observe a
switch in signs. Similarly to Table 2, our extreme measure for PD D 1 2i,t behaves
differently, as 5 of our PAC measures show a negative sign. However, note that
we use the heterogeneity among all firms to explain the price difference for the two
firms with the lowest prices. Hence, it is not surprising that this PD measure yields
different results.
We illustrate in the appendix that under some circumstances, there is a higher
probability that an increase in the heterogeneity in PACs could also lead to a fall in
PD. However, in such an unusual case, we would assume a switch in signs for all of
our PAC proxies. By and large, however, we find that a rise in PAC heterogeneity
causally increases PD.
5.3 Time Split
Our main results in Table 2 are based on a sample from the third quarter of 2006
to the end of 2012. During this period, online markets emerged and consolidated in
Austria, while the technology of e-commerce shops changed fundamentally at the
same time. At the start of this period, firms used software in which someone had
to enter price changes manually. Over the period, modern shop software, which
allows automatic price setting algorithms, became commercially available.24 In that
sense, the firms’ price setting behavior shifted from idiosyncratic decisions for each
product to automated price changes. Of course, this might have lowered the PAC
dramatically over the period, and we would expect a lower association between PAC
and PD towards the end of the period.
The results in Table 7 aim to address this argument. Column (1) tabulates the
estimated impact of PAC proxies on PD for the period of Q3 2006 to Q3 2009.
24Anecdotal evidence from managers suggests that important products (e.g., expensive products
or products with a high markup) are still managed individually and prices are changed manually.
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Column (2) presents the estimation results for the period Q4 2006 to Q4 2012. The
estimated coefficients for the first period demonstrate a robust positive effect of PAC
on PD. In contrast, the results in column (2) are much smaller. Moreover, we also
obtain negative effects. We suppose the change in the technology is the reason for
a less pronounced relationship between PAC and PD in the later period.25
6 Conclusions
Using panel data from a price comparison website, we use several indicators of firms’
price adjustment costs (PACs) to analyze its effect on price dispersion (PD). The
proxies for PAC are either proxies adopted from prior studies or are alternative
indicators that are likely to capture firms’ costs to set prices. To avoid the biases
arising from selective market entry, we use an instrumental variables approach, in
which we derive the instruments from firms’ price setting behavior related to earlier
generations of the product we analyze.
In general, we find considerable PD. Our estimation results suggest that PACs
are a relevant cause for this PD. The estimated impact of our PAC measures is
robust to several alternative empirical strategies. In particular, we stratify the
sample according to several product characteristics, including high-demand versus
low-demand products, and consistently find that a greater PAC leads to more PD.
Our results also show that during the sample period, 2006–2012, the influence
of PAC on PD weakened. We interpret this finding as stemming from the increased
use of specialized price monitoring and price setting software (Kephart et al., 2000).
In all of our specifications, we control for a rich set of alternative theories that
could influence the PD. Our results are consistent with an interpretation that con-
sumers are likely to search more for more expensive products, which will lower PD in
these markets. PD is also greater for products offered by firms with greater hetero-
geneity in their inventories, for non-branded products, and in markets in which firms
25For instance, Calzolari et al. (2018) stress that even small retailers can now afford algorithmic
pricing and that this may have consequences on markup and PD. Artificial intelligence programs
are the next technology to automated price setting. The authors show that these programs have
the potential for autonomous price collusion with obvious consequences for PD.
25
obfuscate prices. In addition, we find less PD for products with greater demand and
for products which are offered by a smaller number of retailers.
Finally, we highlight that the link between the differences in firms’ PACs and
PD is not straightforward. Theoretically, in some situations, an increase in costs, or
the heterogeneity in costs, may result in less PD, and vice versa.
The results imply that even when the search costs for consumers are comparably
low and firms can change prices with one click, PACs may contribute to considerable
PD.
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Appendix
We show that in some situations an increase in PAC or an increase in the variance
of PAC might decrease PD. Surprisingly the economic literature does not offer a
theoretical model of how a greater PAC affects PD. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977)
and Fishman (1992) discuss the relationship between PAC and PD, but do not offer
a model of how changes in PAC impacts PD. Benabou (1988, p. 364) argues that if
price changes are less costly, firms change prices more often and therefore reduce PD.
There is, however, no treatment on how an increase in the level or the heterogeneity
in PACs might affect PD. The typical assumption is that a higher PAC or variation
in PAC will lead to greater PD.
We do not aim to create a full model to analyze the effect of the heterogeneity
in PAC on PD, but to illustrate (i) the effects of increasing average PAC as well as
(ii) the implication of more variance in PAC for PD. We show that in certain cases,
an increase in PACs might even result in less PD. However, in most cases, we find
that increasing the PAC will lead to more PD. We use a very simple illustration to
show this result. As a firm changes its prices only if the costs of doing so are less
than the (expected) benefits of changing the price, greater costs, or more variance,
will lead to more staggered price changes; that is, more PD at a particular point in
time. A small exogenous change in the economic environment (e.g., a change in the
factor or wholesale prices) could lead some firms to adjust their prices, while others
keep their prices unchanged.
To illustrate the relationship between PAC and PD, we assume that for each
firm there exists an Optimal Price Path (OPP), OPPj(t), which reflects the firms
targeted price over time t. We could interpret the OPP as the sequence of optimal
responses to exogenous shocks in the absence of PACs. This path is determined by
the overall economic environment of the firm; that is, the factor costs, price elasticity
of demand or market structure (e.g., we expect that optimal prices are greater in
Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition). All factors that imply
PD for heterogeneous firms (e.g., horizontal product differentiation, different brand
loyalty, different service characteristics, . . . ) could result in idiosyncratic OPPs.
In our illustration, we focus on a market with two firms that offer an identical
good, but which differ in their PACs. This implies that the OPP (t) is identical for
both firms (different price paths do not change our results; however, the illustration
would be more complex). The OPP (t) could, in general, have any functional form.
For illustration purposes, we assume a continuous and non-negative version, as in
Figure 1. Firm 1 has a constant PAC of (1 − h)C. Firm 2’s PAC is greater, at
(1 + h)C. The parameter h (0 < h < 1) captures the heterogeneity in PAC and a
change in h results in a mean-preserving change in PACs.
A firm will change its price only if the benefit of doing so will exceed the cost
of price adjustment. We normalize the amount of sold goods to one, which reduces
the benefit of a price change to the absolute difference in prices.26 In this case,
firms adjust prices only if the difference between the actual and the optimal price
is greater than the firms’ PACs. Over time, when the difference between the actual
price and the OPP equals the firm’s PAC, the firm changes the price to the new
26With this assumption, we do not need to model the cost, demand, and competition structure
explicitly, which would inflate our simple illustration. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) use a similar
approach, in which inflation generates an aspired price path for firms.
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optimal price at time t.27 Consequently, the actual prices are at all times the initial
price plus or minus a multiple of the firms’ PACs. The firm with the lower PAC
adapts faster to the OPP.
For simplicity, we assume that both firms start with their optimal prices at t = 0,
OPP (t = 0) = p01 = p
0
2. For all t > 0 and OPP (t) ≥ p01 = p02, we can state the
prices as
p1(t) = p
0
1 + k1(t)(1− h)C, and (10)
p2(t) = p
0
2 + k2(t)(1 + h)C.
If OPP (t) < p01 = p
0
2, then the prices are p1 = p
0
1 − k1(t)(1 − h)C and p2 =
p02 − k2(t)(1 + h)C. The factors k1(t) and k2(t) denote the multiple of PACs and
are the result of whether the OPP is falling or rising over time. k1(t) is either the
floor function of (|OPP (t)−p01|)/((1−h)C) in case of (steadily) rising prices, or the
ceiling function of (|OPP (t) − p01|)/((1 − h)C) if the OPP is continuously falling.
The argument of the floor (ceiling) function is the rounded difference in the optimal
and actual prices in terms of multiples of PACs (rounded down to the next integer
value for the floor function and rounded up for the ceiling function).
For short episodes of rising and falling OPPs, whether the floor or ceiling func-
tions should be used is path-dependent. We verify our results for all possible com-
binations of the floor and ceiling functions in our illustration.
Figure 1 (Panel A) shows an arbitrary OPP and the sequence of firms’ prices for
(arbitrary) parameter values of C = 3.5 and h = 0.1. At time t = 0, both firms set
optimal prices p01 = p
0
2 = 3. Assume that the absolute difference between the two
actual prices is our measure of PD, PD(t) = |p1− p2| = |p01− p02+ k1(t) ∗ (1+h)C−
k2(t) ∗ (1− h) ∗ C|.
Figure 1 compares the price setting of firms with lower (Panel A) and greater
average PACs (Panel B). Each price change changes the PD, but the direction of the
change depends on the firms’ relative prices and the OPP (t). In this illustration,
the mean PAC increased by 80%. A comparison of the PDs in Panels A and B shows
ambiguous effects of a greater PAC: in some cases, the increase will lead to more
PD, but in other cases, the PD is lower. These periods are shaded in gray.
Change in the level of PAC: Here, we investigate the conditions under which
higher PACs result in less (more) PD. As the functions k1(t) and k2(t) are non-
continuous (and hence is PD), the formal conditions under which an increase in
PAC results in more PD are unwieldy, even in this very simple illustration.
Assume that both firms start with identical prices at t = 0. An increase in the
PAC in the firms’ price setting functions will always lead to more PD, if for neither
firm the price is an exact multiple of the firms’ PAC. When a price is an exact
multiple of PAC, firms will adjust their prices discontinuously. This result holds for
all combinations of floor and ceiling functions, although the discontinuities might
occur at different levels of PAC. Figure 2 (Panel A) presents a graphical illustration
of the application of the floor function for both firms, and hence the assumption of
long-run upward trend in the OPP (t).
27The OPP represents the sequence of optimal responses to unexpected exogenous shocks. It is
not possible for firms to adopt forward looking behavior in price setting to address future price
shocks.
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When firms have different prices at t = 0, p01 = p02, we observe a (continuous)
decrease in PD for certain parameter values when PACs are increasing.28 Figure 2
(Panel B) illustrates this case. Generally, the greater the differences in the starting
prices relative to C are, the larger the parameter space in which PD is decreasing
when C increases. Note, however, that the greater the difference in starting prices
is, the more unrealistic are the parameter constellations for real markets.
Change in the heterogeneity in PACs: An even less clear case arises when we
consider the impact of firms’ heterogeneity in PAC on PD. For both identical and
different start prices, we find parameter constellations in which PD decreases when
PAC increases. Even in the case in which the firms have different PACs, we observe
constellations where the PD is zero.29
Figure 2 (Panels C and D) illustrates the effect of an increase in the heterogeneity
in PACs on PD. Note that the question of whether an increase in the heterogeneity
in PACs has a positive or negative effect on PD is essentially an empirical one. An
increase in the heterogeneity in PACs also implies a change in the average PAC,
which we ruled out here by the definition of PAC. Although we might expect a
positive effect of PAC heterogeneity on PD, the connection is much less clear than
the effect of an increase in the level of PACs is.
28The exact parameter constellations for a continuously falling PD when PAC are increasing
are:
[
C < (p01− p02)/(−Fm+Fp+(Fm+Fp)h)
]
AND
[[
p01 > p
0
2 AND
[
(Fm = Fp) OR
[
Fm >
Fp AND (2Fm)/(Fm + Fp) < (1 + h)
]]]
OR
[
p01 < p
0
2 AND (2Fm)/(Fm + Fp) > (1 +
h) AND Fm > Fp
]]
, with Fm = Floor(OPP (t)/(C(1−h))) and Fp = Floor(OPP (t)/(C(1+h))).
For other combinations of the floor and ceiling functions, we can derive similar conditions. Note
that some combinations of floor and ceiling functions show a larger parameter space for falling
PD functions. As this appendix is mainly for illustrative purposes, we do not elaborate on these
conditions.
29In the case of identical starting prices, the conditions for a decreasing PD are
[
Fm =
Fp
]
OR
[
Fm > Fp AND (2Fm)/(Fm + Fp) < AND (1 + h)
]
. Again, we have discontinuities
(kinks or upward or downward jumps) when a price is an exact multiple of the PAC. For situations
with different starting prices, the conditions are more complicated:
[[
Fm = Fp
]
AND
[[
p01 <=
p02
]
OR
[
p01 > p
0
2 AND C > (p
0
1−p02)/(−Fm+Fp+(Fm+Fp)h)
]]]
OR
[[
Fm > Fp
]
AND
[[
1+
h < (2Fm)/(Fm+Fp) AND p01 < p
0
2 AND C < (p
0
1−p02)/(−Fm+Fp+(Fm+Fp)h)
]
OR
[
1+h =
(2Fm)/(Fm + Fp) AND p01 < p
0
2
]
OR
[
p02 > 0 AND (2Fm)/(Fm + Fp) < 1 + h AND
[
(p01 <=
p02) OR [p
0
1 > p
0
2 AND C > (p
0
1 − p02)/(−Fm + Fp + (Fm + Fp)h)]
]]]]
. Again, we assume a
continuously increasing OPP (t); that is, we apply floor functions. For other combinations of floor
and ceiling functions, we can derive similar conditions.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Illustration of low and high PAC on PD.
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Note: OPP (t) shows the optimal price path both firms would followed if no PAC would be incurred.
The figure compares two scenarios with different PACs (low PAC in Panel A and high PAC in Panel
B). The shaded areas show time periods where we observe lower PD in the case of higher average
PAC for both firms. We chose the following parameterization for the price paths: p01 = p
0
2 =
OPP (0) = 3, h = 0.1, Panel A’s C = 3.5, Panel B’s C = 6.3.
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Figure 2: Effects of PAC average and PAC heterogeneity on PD.
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Note: The figure illustrates the effects of changes in the PAC average and PAC heterogeneity on
PD. For all graphs Floor Functions have been used to calculate the multiple of PAC (hence a
monotoneous increase of OPP(t) has been assumed). The four figures show that under certain
parameter constellations an increase in average PAC or PAC heterogeneity can decrease PD. For
example, in Panel A, an increase in PAC from 3.18 increases PD from 0.33 to 2.57, and an incrase
at 3.21 reduces PD from 2.62 to 0.94. Parametrization: Panel A [OPP (t) = 14, h = 0.1, p1(0) =
p2(0) = 2], Panel B [OPP (t) = 14, h = 0.1, p1(0) = 1.5, p2(0) = 2.5], Panel C [OPP (t) = 14,
C = 1.5, p1(0) = p2(0) = 2], Panel D [OPP (t) = 14, C = 1.5, p1(0) = 1.5, p2(0) = 2.5].
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of our main variables.
Mean Standard Minium Maximum
Deviation
Price Dispersion Indicators
Coefficient of Variation, CoV 0.120 0.121 0 4.240
Value of Information, V oI 0.200 0.309 0 5.000
Difference lowest two prices, D 1 2 0.113 0.212 0 2.000
Price Adjustment Costs Indicators
LENGTH∆p 52.63 50.56 2.234 1.132
HEIGHT∆p 0.101 0.0474 0.0067 1.826
L×H∆p 10.99 16.90 0.0962 1.190
RANK 0.07 0.0125 0.00186 0.176
SYNCT 0.0801 0.0468 0.0001 0.834
SYNCH 2,516 211.1 -72.77 7,816
SYNCI 201.1 118.5 -6.141 2,105
E-tailer characteristics
Firm Evaluation Avg. (1=good,5=bad) 1.638 0.371 1 5
Firm Evaluation Std. 0.387 0.278 0 2
Pick-Up-Possibility Std. 0.320 0.201 0 0.500
Percentage Big Brand Std. 0.113 0.0614 0 0.500
Shipping Costs Std. 3.284 4.020 0 47.86
Clicks on Firm Avg. 149,535 170,399 79 914,418
Clicks on Firm Std. 192,839 188,771 0 723,752
Product characteristics
Availability Std. 0.0682 0.0287 0 0.0995
No. of Price Leader Changes 5.516 7.887 0 82
No. of Offering Firms 10.36 10.74 2 87
Price in Euro 288.3 699.4 0.710 9,999
Austrian Clicks on Product 88.94 584.7 0 146,137
Note: Descriptive statistics for the variables of our main regressions are shown. The observational unit refers to products i which
are observed over time t: We have 1,698,370 observations for 241,606 products. E-tailer and product characteristics are calculated
using the average (Avg.) or the standard deviation (Std.) of the offering firms on market i. For the regressions these variables are
transformed into z-scores (mean of 0 and variance of 1).
36
Table 2: Estimated effect of price adjustment costs on price dispersion.
CoV V oI D 1 2 First Stage
(1) (2) (3) F-statistic
LENGTH∆p 0.0653*** 0.0759*** 0.0642*** 3,503.5
(0.00599) (0.00704) (0.00726)
HEIGHT∆p 0.0171*** 0.00803 0.00935 2,547.7
(0.00543) (0.00500) (0.00687)
L×H∆p 0.0396*** 0.0419*** 0.0269*** 791.4
(0.00444) (0.00472) (0.00542)
RANK 0.00545** 0.00446* b0.0352*** 73,891.9
(0.00268) (0.00249) (0.00300)
SYNCT 0.0267*** 0.0419*** b0.0131* 13,603.0
(0.00640) (0.00604) (0.00698)
SYNCH 0.0119*** 0.00702*** 0.0152*** 30,903.8
(0.000892) (0.000670) (0.00133)
SYNCI 0.0518*** 0.0543*** 0.0181*** 17,181.0
(0.00563) (0.00528) (0.00622)
Controls yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes
Note: 1,698,370 observations on 241,606 products. Coefficients for the con-
trols of column (1) are tabulated in Table 3. All variables are transformed
into z-scores (mean of 0 and variance of 1). Hence, each number is a beta
coefficient from a separate 2SLS-panel regression where the F-statistics from
the first stages are presented in column (4). Price dispersions are measured
by the coefficient of variation (column (1)), the value of information (column
(2)), and the difference between the lowest and the second lowest price (D 1 2,
column (3)). Price adjustment costs are proxied by the firms’ price setting
behavior and are based on the firms’ price changes, the variance of the rank
of their prices, and on the synchronicity of their price changes. All regressions
include the same set of covariates, the estimated coefficients are presented be-
low in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 3: Estimated coefficients for price dispersion, measured by CoV (2SLS), by proxy for PAC.
Included PAC (see Table 2) LENGTH∆p HEIGHT∆p L×H∆p RANK SYNCT SYNCH SYNCI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Evaluation Avg. -0.0356*** -0.0332*** -0.0349*** -0.0314*** -0.0286*** -0.0299*** -0.0253***
(0.00176) (0.00181) (0.00176) (0.00169) (0.00184) (0.00169) (0.00184)
Evaluation Std. 0.0541*** 0.0520*** 0.0545*** 0.0510*** 0.0499*** 0.0518*** 0.0494***
(0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00140) (0.00133) (0.00137) (0.00133) (0.00135)
Pick-Up-Possibility Std. 0.0759*** 0.0747*** 0.0738*** 0.0746*** 0.0739*** 0.0748*** 0.0729***
(0.00132) (0.00132) (0.00133) (0.00132) (0.00134) (0.00132) (0.00133)
Percentage Big Brand Std. 0.0268*** 0.0289*** 0.0284*** 0.0302*** 0.0311*** 0.0297*** 0.0323***
(0.00162) (0.00161) (0.00160) (0.00159) (0.00162) (0.00159) (0.00162)
Shipping Costs Std. 0.0169*** 0.0153*** 0.0158*** 0.0147*** 0.0140*** 0.0150*** 0.0130***
(0.000743) (0.000727) (0.000727) (0.000736) (0.000752) (0.000724) (0.000745)
Clicks on Firm Avg. -0.200*** -0.210*** -0.208*** -0.215*** -0.221*** -0.214*** -0.227***
(0.00344) (0.00348) (0.00328) (0.00325) (0.00359) (0.00322) (0.00352)
Clicks on Firm Std. 0.237*** 0.248*** 0.241*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.249***
(0.00352) (0.00345) (0.00349) (0.00344) (0.00346) (0.00345) (0.00346)
Availability Std. 0.0241*** 0.0248*** 0.0253*** 0.0250*** 0.0256*** 0.0253*** 0.0267***
(0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00125) (0.00124) (0.00125)
No. of Price Leader Changes -0.0139*** -0.0149*** -0.0148*** -0.0154*** -0.0174*** -0.0150*** -0.0195***
(0.000967) (0.000964) (0.000963) (0.000965) (0.00109) (0.000962) (0.00106)
No. of Offering Firms 0.0698*** 0.0634*** 0.0645*** 0.0621*** 0.0575*** 0.0626*** 0.0521***
(0.00267) (0.00261) (0.00261) (0.00263) (0.00289) (0.00261) (0.00284)
Price in Euro 0.0297 0.0245 0.0268 0.0243 0.0228 0.0247 0.0212
(0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0185)
Austrian Clicks on Product -0.00525*** -0.00559*** -0.00542*** -0.00556*** -0.00519*** -0.00555*** -0.00480***
(0.00104) (0.00106) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00104) (0.00105) (0.00102)
Quarter Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,698,370 1,698,370 1,698,370 1,698,370 1,698,370 1,698,370 1,698,370
R-squared 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.038
Number of products 241,606 241,606 241,606 241,606 241,606 241,606 241,606
Note: 1,698,370 observations on 241,606 products. Dependent variable is price dispersion CoV . Each column includes the set
of controls for one regression including a different measure of PAC, these coefficients are tabulated in Table 2. All variables are
transformed into z-scores (mean of 0 and variance of 1). Hence, each number is a beta coefficient from a separate 2SLS-panel
regression. E-tailer and product characteristics are calculated using the average (Avg.) or the standard deviation (Std.) of the
offering firms on market i. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Robustness - Type of Product (Demand & Brand ).
Dependent: PD CoV DEMAND TYPE OF PRODUCT
LOW HIGH BRANDED NO-Name
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables for price adjustment cost
LENGTH∆p 0.0289*** 0.105*** 0.0354*** 0.0679***
(0.00895) (0.00796) (0.00930) (0.00742)
HEIGHT∆p 0.00911 0.0305*** 0.00588 0.0228***
(0.00724) (0.00823) (0.00959) (0.00656)
L×H∆p 0.0137** 0.0812*** 0.0783*** 0.0325***
(0.00555) (0.00808) (0.0172) (0.00455)
RANK 0.000716 0.0139*** 0.0272*** -0.0247***
(0.00342) (0.00418) (0.00377) (0.00386)
SYNCT 0.0266*** 0.0272*** 0.0236*** 0.0141
(0.00810) (0.0101) (0.00879) (0.00975)
SYNCH 0.0141*** 0.000221 0.0185*** 0.00989***
(0.000980) (0.00208) (0.00303) (0.000945)
SYNCI 0.0626*** 0.0356*** 0.0344*** 0.0504***
(0.00663) (0.00964) (0.00868) (0.00772)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 747,514 950,856 813,921 884,449
Number of products 120,564 121,042 116,293 125,314
Note: Price dispersion CoV is used as dependent variable. The columns refer to different product types (high versus low demand products,
branded versus no-name products). The rows show the coefficients for different PAC measures. All variables are transformed into z-scores
(mean of 0 and variance of 1). Hence, each number is a beta coefficient from a separate 2SLS-panel regression including the set of controls.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Robustness - Product Main Categories.
Dependent: PD CoV PRODUCT MAIN CATEGORIES
AUDIO HEALTH AND MOVIES GAMES HARDWARE HOME AND SOFTWARE SPORTS PHONE VIDEO/TV/
BEAUTY LIVING CAMERAS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LENGTH∆p 0.0210** -0.00406 0.0709*** 0.0667* 0.0959*** -0.000220 0.0493** 0.0243* 0.297*** 0.0755***
(0.00914) (0.0485) (0.0202) (0.0401) (0.0205) (0.00670) (0.0243) (0.0128) (0.0908) (0.00993)
HEIGHT∆p 0.00921 -0.0865** 0.0351 -0.129** 0.0423*** -0.00803 -0.00448 -0.0226*** 0.0754 0.0853***
(0.0117) (0.0347) (0.0213) (0.0590) (0.0119) (0.00552) (0.0226) (0.00838) (0.0641) (0.0134)
L×H∆p 0.0206** -0.0745 0.0354** 0.0462* 0.0904*** 0.00181 0.0979*** 0.00602 0.353*** 0.115***
(0.0101) (0.0475) (0.0140) (0.0274) (0.0195) (0.00192) (0.0348) (0.00420) (0.108) (0.0120)
RANK 0.00926 -0.0115 -0.0372*** -0.0760** -0.0148*** 0.0233*** -0.0128 0.0577*** 0.0436 0.0936***
(0.0132) (0.0191) (0.00687) (0.0322) (0.00525) (0.00439) (0.0101) (0.00809) (0.0342) (0.0100)
SYNCT -0.00149 0.0800 -0.000618 -0.00971 -0.0168* 0.0125 -0.0951*** 0.240*** 0.00217 0.183***
(0.0544) (0.0570) (0.0457) (0.0846) (0.00975) (0.0141) (0.0224) (0.0451) (0.0591) (0.0170)
SYNCH 0.00561 -0.0168*** 0.00807*** 0.00709* 0.0449*** -0.000279 0.0218*** -0.000671 0.0196* 0.0198***
(0.0103) (0.00514) (0.00107) (0.00388) (0.0102) (0.00295) (0.00696) (0.00459) (0.0107) (0.00627)
SYNCI 0.00862 0.0449 0.100*** 0.0550 -0.00894 0.0149 -0.0657*** 0.169*** 0.0270 0.194***
(0.0521) (0.0436) (0.0149) (0.0593) (0.00986) (0.0125) (0.0204) (0.0334) (0.0617) (0.0166)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 67,517 21,203 242,697 60,758 649,611 202,681 58,515 53,707 49,102 234,119
Number of products 11,267 3,237 26,865 9,395 92,099 28,175 11,598 10,191 8,761 30,865
Note: Price dispersion CoV is used as dependent variable. The columns refer to different product categories offered at the website from geizhals.at. The rows show
the coefficients for different PAC measures. All variables are transformed into z-scores (mean of 0 and variance of 1). Hence, each number is a beta coefficient from a
separate 2SLS-panel regression including the set of controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Robustness - Alternative PAC Measures.
Dependent price dispersion CoV V oI D 1 2
(1) (2) (3)
STD(LENGTH∆p) 0.0214*** 0.0240*** -0.0252***
(0.00328) (0.00313) (0.00415)
STD(HEIGHT∆p) 0.0658*** 0.0837*** 0.0459***
(0.00462) (0.00576) (0.00560)
STD(L×H∆p) 0.0435*** 0.0510*** 0.0264***
(0.00389) (0.00455) (0.00447)
STD(RANK) -0.00141 -0.0199*** -0.0408***
(0.00421) (0.00392) (0.00419)
STD(SYNCT ) -0.00253 0.0163*** -0.0197***
(0.00402) (0.00384) (0.00417)
STD(SYNCH) -0.0300*** -0.0212*** -0.0230***
(0.00112) (0.000926) (0.00149)
STD(SYNCI) 0.00305 0.0191*** -0.0115***
(0.00393) (0.00375) (0.00408)
Controls yes yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes yes
Note: 1,698,370 observations on 241,606 products. Columns re-
fer to our measures for price dispersion used above. Rows show
the coefficients for the markets’ standard deviation of the offer-
ing firms’ PAC measures as an indicator for the heterogeneity in
PAC. All variables are transformed into z-scores (mean of 0 and
variance of 1). Each number is a beta coefficient from a separate
2SLS-panel regression. All regressions include the same set of co-
variates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Robustness - Time Split.
PERIOD
Dependent: PD CoV QUARTER 1-13 QUARTER 14-26
(1) (2)
LENGTH∆p 0.0927*** 0.0596***
(0.00825) (0.00666)
HEIGHT∆p 0.0533*** 0.00835
(0.00893) (0.00588)
L×H∆p 0.176*** 0.0238***
(0.0157) (0.00356)
RANK 0.0559*** -0.0393***
(0.00361) (0.00435)
SYNCT 0.120*** -0.0676***
(0.0101) (0.00858)
SYNCH 0.00820*** 0.103***
(0.000941) (0.0159)
SYNCI 0.125*** -0.0611***
(0.00744) (0.00859)
Controls yes yes
Product fixed effects yes yes
Observations 671,569 1,009,234
Number of products 120,130 170,372
Note: Price dispersion CoV is used as dependent variable. The
columns refer to a time split between the first and the second half of
our observation period. The rows show the coefficients for different
PAC measures. All variables are transformed into z-scores (mean
of 0 and variance of 1). Hence, each number is a beta coefficient
from a separate 2SLS-panel regression including the set of controls.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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